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Introduction 
Cyber incidents can be defined as violations of explicit or implied policies that can include 
unauthorized access, disruption, unauthorized use, or changes to systems, networks, hardware, 
and software (US Cert, 2018).  This description does not account for all possibilities and cyber 
incidents continue to evolve and increase in visibility for organizations (Pescatore, 2017).   
Cyber incidents can have real costs associated with them to governments, companies, and 
individuals.  For instance, in December of 2013 Target Corp. reported a data breach of 40 
million credit card accounts (Krebs, 2013).  According to their 2016 SEC filings, it cost the 
company $291 million and hurt their reputation in the market (Herberger, 2016).  Another 
great example would be the StuxNet attack where a worm was able to physically damage lab 
equipment required to develop nuclear weapons in Iran.  The costs of lost national security, 
development time, and cost of the equipment were huge, but are not easily calculated 
(Kushner, 2013).  Further the recent cyber incident at Equifax, where on September 7th of 2017 
an estimated 143 million U.S. consumers’ data was breached at Equifax.   While this is costly to 
the organization it had larger implications for consumers and the economy (DeMarco, 2018).    
Problem Statement 
To combat these cyber incidents organizations, governments, and professionals should to be 
able to identify these incidents and describe them effectively to better protect against them.  
As Peter Denning stated in 2010, “It is not possible to build strong defenses without acquiring 
and maintaining a solid understanding of how attacks work and how effective they might be.” 
(Denning, 2010).   To identify and learn more about these cyber-attacks and incidents we need 
a solid foundation of evaluation and method of classification to be able to share information 
about attacks and their characteristics.  Classification models and taxonomies have been 
proposed for cyber-attacks dating back from 1984 (Igure, 2008). The challenge with the 
numerous taxonomies and models is determining which to use and how to use them.  This 
research focuses on evaluating cyber incident models and to determine which cyber incident 
model is best at answering the following questions through a qualitative investigation.  
1. How easy is the model to understand and communicate? 
2. Does the model give insight on how to defend in the future? 
3. Does it account for all areas of attacks and does the classification give 
meaningful information?  
4. Is it flexible to adapt to changes in cyber incidents? 
The analysis and evaluation of the models will be conducted through the classification process 
and thorough comparison of the final classifications of two separate cyber incidents.  When 
looking at the first question the analysis hinges on whether a person with no knowledge of the 
attack is able to understand and describe the cyber incident.  The second question will be 
evaluated on how well the categorization gives direction on how to take defensive measures 
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into the future.  The third question looks at whether the model captures the full breadth of the 
incident and if it leaves out any obvious factors or elements that exist in cyber incidents.  The 
last question’s analysis relies on the ease of adding elements or factors to the model and how 
well the model captures uncertainty.  Due to the qualitative nature of the questions, the 
evaluation of the models relies on judgment developed through the application and final result 
of the categorization of the cyber incidents in this study.  
Background & Previous Research 
There has been extensive research on security models, but few have focused on cyber incidents 
and evaluating which would be suitable for wide adoption of security professionals.  Cyber 
incident taxonomies date back to 1984 with the Perry and Walich developing a two dimensional 
model where one dimension described the actor in the attack and the second dimension was 
aimed at the type of cyber incident (Perry, 1984).  The largest weakness however was that the 
actor dimension was specific and showed little value in categorization and the incident was 
categorized by the impact and did not consider the incident’s details as stated by Igure and 
Williams (Igure, 2008).  Late Brinkley and Shell presented another model focused on “misuse”, 
but the events can be considered attacks or incidents.  Their model is hierarchical and is 
designed as a method of listing the possible misuse in computer systems (Brinkley, 1995).  Due 
to this fact, it is only effective for classification and not security action.  In 1997, Fred Cohen 
developed a taxonomy to inform security assessment, with the goal of fitting all attacks into 
one taxonomy (Cohen, 1997).  It essentially created a list of cyber incidents, 94 different 
incident classifications.  With a specific list of incidents, it is static and shows no way to be 
flexible and grow with technological advances (Igure, 2008).  Neumann worked for many years 
to develop a classification system and ultimately in 1995 published a classification system 
including 26 incidents or attacks into 9 categories (Igure, 2008, Neumann, 1995).  The 
classifications are hard to link and not fully refined, if able to pinpoint the area of the flaw it 
could have been informative to security assessment (Igure, 2008).  Lindquist and Jonsson built 
upon Neumann and Parker’s classification and further divided three categories to add another 
layer to the taxonomy and better describe the classification (Igure, 2008; Lindquist, 1997).  They 
were the first to introduce the idea of dimension of classification (Lindquist, 1997). Thus, 
leading to hierarchical taxonomies with each level further describing the factors involved and 
better describing the vulnerabilities that allowed the attack.   
There are many additional taxonomies that focus on specialized areas such as web specific 
attacks (Alvarez, 2003), denial of service (DoS) attacks (Gerber, 2000; Kumar, 2006; Kumar 
2005; Mirkovic, 2004), and intrusion detection methods (Kumar, 1995; Killourhy, 2004).  
However, these models are narrow focused and do not encompass the goal of an overarching 
taxonomy that can capture all cyber attack areas.   
Further there are several models that were created to assist in security evaluation that are 
effective at capturing facets that are present in all cyber incidents.  For instance, Lough 
developed a taxonomy that attempted to build a taxonomy that included all common factors 
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across attacks (Lough, 2001).  Lough put all attacks into four categories, the categories are 
determined by the cause of the attack however, due to the general nature of this taxonomy 
and the blending of cause and vulnerabilities Lough’s model is not particularly effective for a 
security evaluation.  One interesting application of a security evaluation focused taxonomy is 
Mostow et all’s attempt at building an attack simulator and using a taxonomy to get proper 
coverage of attacks within the simulation (Mostow, 2000).  The simulator was devised to better 
measure security postures and be able to measure the security of a system.  The limitation of 
the taxonomy used was there was only a single level developed and was not the focus of the 
research.  Delooze went on to build upon Mostow’s taxonomy which created a tree diagram 
and ended up with 25 different leaf’s that covered many known internet attacks or incidents 
(Delooze, 2004).  The attacks from the CVE list were classified to show usage of the taxonomy.  
While further developed than Mostow’s model, Delooze’s taxonomy was not all encompassing 
and left certain factors out such as effect of attack and categorized attacks on a single basis.   
Hansman and Hunt in 2004 determined that developing a single tree taxonomy was not 
appropriate and decided to propose four separate taxonomies to better describe cyber 
incidents (Hansman, 2005).  The four taxonomies focused on attack vector, attack target, 
vulnerabilities and exploits, and attacks with payloads.  All of the taxonomies had a hierarchy 
with further detail described as the level increased.  While each taxonomy is able to capture the 
element of an attack it tries to capture it is cumbersome to use all four to classify each attack.  
As Igure and Williams aptly stated most if not all taxonomies try to capture four elements of 
cyber incidents, impact of attack, cause of attack (vulnerability exploited), target of the attack, 
and the scope of the attack (Igure, 2008).  These taxonomies all have weaknesses and strengths 
in their implementation and design, but all grapple with the same issues of best describing and 
categorizing the factors and elements of cyber incidents. 
The following taxonomies and models are recent and influential models being considered 
today.   In 2006, Nong Ye et all proposed a framework to classify cyber attacks or incidents 
focusing on separating cause and effect of the attack (Ye, 2006).  They leaned on system 
engineering, fault modeling, and risk assessment theories to create a model with seven areas of 
categorization; objective, propagation, attack origin, action, vulnerability, asset, state effects, 
and performance effects.  Their model allows for further description in each category and 
flexibility to evolve as the nature of cyber attacks do.  While the model is effective in modeling 
the factors in an attack it does not account for multiple step attacks or incidents and does not 
allow for a hierarchical segmentation of attacks.  Then in 2011, Eric Hutchins et all published a 
model known as the cyber kill chain in partnership with Lockheed Martin (Hutchins, 2011).  The 
attack classification model focuses on advanced persistent threats (APT’s) or “well-resourced 
and trained adversaries that conduct multi-year intrusion campaigns targeting highly sensitive 
economic, proprietary, or national security information.” (Hutchins, 2011). The model’s goal is 
to define the series of steps in successful attacks and the counter measures available at each 
step.  The model has seven steps and they are reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, 
exploitation, installation, command and control, and actions on objectives.  This model gives 
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great insight into all attacks and can direct efforts against future and current attacks on 
security.  However, this model is not a true classification model and focuses on 
countermeasures to attacks and how to better implement them.  In 2014, Simmons et all 
proposed a new taxonomy for cyber attacks and incidents, AVOIDIT (Simmons, 2014).  The 
model proposed builds off of previous models from Lough, Howard, and Hansman.  The model 
classifies attack factors by attack vector, operational impact, defense, informational impact, 
and target.  Further, the model allows a single attack to have multiple attack vectors to better 
describe multi step attacks.  This is accomplished through their CADAT process and tree 
structures.  AVOIDIT was applied at the IRS to classify attacks and the results of the testing is 
not clear.  AVOIDIT gives thorough information in its classification, but does not account for 
physical attacks and the defense factor gives little insight on how to implement the defense.   
Methods 
There are few examples of extensive taxonomy review and prove effective for understanding 
the differences and relative strengths and weaknesses of each model (Igure, 2008; Joshi, 2015).  
Some proposed models compare themselves against similar models to show they are able to 
improve upon their predecessors (Simmons, 2014).  Few attempts have been made to capture 
the breadth of taxonomies and models available.  Thus, computer security world has no 
definitive model to classify cyber incidents.  Evaluation of the current models available gives 
insight as to the best option and can drive further innovation towards an ideal classification 
system. 
This evaluation will look at the previous stated qualitative measures to determine the most 
effective model.  To measure each category intuition of the final categorization and the process 
of fitting each cyber incident to the model will be used. 
1. How easy is the model to understand and communicate? 
2. Does the model give insight on how to defend in the future? 
3. Does it account for all areas of attacks and does the classification give 
meaningful information?  
4. Is it flexible to adapt to changes in cyber incidents? 
Selection of Models 
The models selected include Howard & Longstaff’s Computer and Network Incident Taxonomy , 
Simmons’ et al AVOIDIT Cyber Attack Taxonomy, and the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain 
(Howard, 1998; Simmons, 2014; Hutchins 2011).  Each model is able to capture different 
elements of a cyber incident and all capture the elements of a cyber incident differently.  
Howard & Longstaff’s model focuses on the attacker and the event, while the AVOID it model 
focuses on the attack vector and the operational impact of the incident.  Finally, the cyber kill 
chain focuses on defense and the steps involved in the attack.  These models give a breadth of 
categorizations that give further insight on what types of models are most effective.   
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Selection of Cyber Incidents 
To best measure the models being evaluated, the cyber incidents need to be diverse in size and 
scope. Unfortunately, there is limited detail information on smaller attacks as they are not 
reported as often or thoroughly.  To best fit each model details on attackers, the attack vector, 
targets, and objectives are needed to provide the information necessary for categorization into 
each respective model. Many attacks have multiple facets to the total event and to best 
measure how a model captures that information, both attacks selected have multiple steps in 
their attack profile.   
Two cyber incidents were selected based upon available detailed information.  The two attacks 
are as follows: 
1. Target Breach, Between November 27th and December 18th 2013 
2. Equifax Breach, Announced September 7th 2017 
Target Breach 
In November of 2013 Target Corporation’s network was breached and 40 million credit card 
details and 70 million personal records were stolen (Shu, 2017).  It appears the initial incident 
occurred when a third party’s computer was compromised, likely though an email attachment, 
which gave the attackers access to Target’s internal network.  Once the attackers gained access 
to the internal network they were able to leverage default passwords to install malware on the 
point of sale terminals which was able to pull credit card information from the RAM in the 
machine when cards were scanned.  After collecting the credit card information the attackers 
were then able to transfer the data out of the network through Target’s own FTP servers using 
valid user name and password combinations during the peak times of the day.  The diagram 
below displays the order of events of the attack (Shu, 2017).  
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Equifax Breach 
The Equifax breach was announced on September 7th and the initial breach occurred on March 
10th (Krebs, 2018).  The breach included the disclosure of an estimated 143 million U.S. 
consumers information.  This information included credit card numbers, names, social security 
numbers, addresses, birthdates, and driver license numbers (Marinos, 2018).  Further the 
breach greatly affected the reputation and standing of the credit agency to the general public.  
According to the congressional report it appears that the initial breach was due to a 
vulnerability in the Apache Struts running on a web server at Equifax, CVE-2017-5638 (Marinos, 
2018; Krebs 2017).  Then once the attackers had access through the vulnerability they were 
able to use a variety of tools to leverage and gain access to databases holding the information 
ultimately stolen.  They were then able to extract the data slowly over 76 days to an offsite 
location.  Please refer to the diagram below outlining the attack (Marinos, 2018). 
 
 
Modeling the Incidents 
When fitting each cyber incident or attack into the models there is room for judgement 
decisions to determine how the elements should be categorized.  When determining the best 
categorization multiple sources of the attack were consulted and the definitions from the 
model itself.  Both Howard and Longstaff’s model and the AVOIDIT model give clear insight on 
the categorization of each element and in most cases give clear definitions of each of the 
classifications (Howard 1998, Simmons 2014).  Both attempting to meet each of the six criteria 
Howard and Longstaff state; mutual exclusivity, exhaustive, unambiguous, repeatable, 
accepted, and useful.  However the Cyber Kill Chain model is more fluid in its categorization as 
it was not designed as a classification model, but a mapping of the process of advanced 
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persistent threats (Hutchins, 2011).  Ultimately best judgement and comparison to other 
sources determined the best categorization for each element within each model.   
In the AVOIDIT model, the authors give insight on how to apply incidents to the model, using 
their CADAT process.  Using this method I found that the model was unclear on how to capture 
multiple actions in the incident (Simmons, 2014).  Further, Howard and Longstaff’s model did 
give some insight in their model that with the attackers and objectives staying constant you can 
categorize an incident with different tools, vulnerabilities, actions, targets, and unauthorized 
results (Howard, 1998).  Using these insights, the AVOIDIT model was slightly altered to include 
multiple actions over the course of the incident.   
The Cyber Kill Chain model required the most use of judgement to best describe the incidents in 
the appropriate manner.  In an ideal setup, the Cyber Kill chain works best in a report format 
where details can be better highlighted in each phase of the “kill chain”.  This is best 
represented in the congressional report “A “Kill Chain” Analysis of the 2013 Target Data 
Breach” created to explain the process of the attack to congressional members on the 
committee on commerce, science, and transportation (US Congress, 2014).  Thus the pertinent 
details are captured in the Cyber Kill Chain model, but in a few words or less.   
Findings 
The following section begins with the classifications in table form, beginning with the Target 
Breach and then the Equifax Breach, followed by general findings from each model.  Then 
evaluations of each question and final comments on the models as a whole.   
 
Target Breach Model Categorization 
 
 
Howard and Longstaff’s Computer and Network Incident Taxonomy 
 
Target 
Breach 
Attackers Tool Vulnerability Action Target Unauthorized 
Result 
Objectives 
Phase 
1 
Hackers/Professional 
Criminals 
Information 
Exchange 
Configuration Modify Computer Increased 
Access 
Financial 
Gain 
Phase 
2 
Hackers/Professional 
Criminals 
User Command Implementation Authen
ticate 
Network Increased 
Access 
Financial 
Gain 
Phase 
3 
Hackers/Professional 
Criminals 
Script or 
Program / Data 
Tap 
Configuration Read Data Disclosure of 
Information 
Financial 
Gain 
Phase 
4 
Hackers/Professional 
Criminals 
Script or 
Program 
Implementation Steal Data Theft of 
Resources 
Financial 
Gain 
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AVOIDIT Cyber Attack Taxonomy 
Target 
Breach Attack Vector 
Operational 
Impact Defense 
Informational 
Impact Target 
Phase 
1 Social Engineering User Compromise 
Mitigation(remove 
from network) Discover Client 
Phase 
2 
Insufficient Authentication 
Validation: BA Web Compromise 
Mitigation(remove 
from network) Discover Network 
Phase 
3 Misconfiguration 
Installed Malware 
(Spyware) Mitigation(whitelisting) Discover 
Application / 
Client 
Phase 
4 
Misconfiguration / Design 
Flaws 
Misuse of 
Resources 
Mitigation(whitelisting 
FTP Sites) Disclose Network 
 
 
Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain 
Reconnaissance Weaponization Delivery Exploitation Installation 
Command & 
Control Actions/Objectives 
Web Research 
on 3rd Party 
and Target 
PDF or 
Microsoft 
Office 
Document 
Spearphishing 
Email led to 
Credentials 
on Target 
Internal 
Network  
Using 
Stolen 
Credentials 
to Install 
RAM 
Scraping 
Malware 
Installed 
on POS 
Machines 
using 
Default 
Account 
Name 
Continued 
use of Stolen 
Credentials & 
Installation 
of Malware 
FTP transfer of 
Data to Off 
Network Server.   
 
Equifax Breach Model Categorization 
 
 
Howard and Longstaff’s Computer and Network Incident Taxonomy 
Equifax 
Breach Attackers Tool Vulnerability Action Target Unauthorized Result Objectives 
Phase 
1 Hackers 
Script or 
Program Implementation Bypass Process Increased Access 
Financial 
Gain 
Phase 
2 Hackers 
User 
Command Configuration Read Data 
Disclosure of 
Information 
Financial 
Gain 
Phase 
3 Hackers 
User 
Command Configuration Steal Data Theft of Resources 
Financial 
Gain 
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AVOIDIT Cyber Attack Taxonomy 
Equifax 
Breach Attack Vector 
Operational 
Impact Defense 
Informational 
Impact Target 
Phase 1 
Insufficient Input 
Validation: XSS Web Compromise 
Mitigation (CVE-2017-
5638) Discover Network 
Phase 2 Design Flaws 
Misuse of 
Resources 
Mitigation (remove from 
network) Disclose Application 
 
Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain 
Reconnaissance Weaponization Delivery Exploitation Installation 
Command & 
Control Actions/Objectives 
Scanning of 
Apache Struts 
Web Sites 
Crafting URL 
for Apache 
Struts 
Vulnerability 
HTTP 
Request to 
Vulnerable 
Server 
Exploit 
Struts 
Vulnerability 
for network 
access 
Install 
Malicious 
Code to 
Create 
Backdoor 
Access 
Collect 
Sensitive 
Information 
and Prepare 
for FTP 
Transfer 
Exfiltration over 76 
days using FTP 
Server 
 
Overall, the models capture different details of the attack and when looking through them it is 
apparent that no model was able to categorize the incidents fully.   
Howard and Longstaff’s model is able to capture the attacker and the motivations through the 
objectives category that help to better understand the attack as a whole.  Although it is difficult 
to determine the motivations of an attacker, and in many cases can only be inferred.  This 
model captures events quite well in that it can be quickly understood and read.  For instance, in 
the Equifax breach phase 1, the hackers used a script or program to bypass a process to 
increase their access.  The model creates almost a sentence structure that is intuitive.  In doing 
so the categories become quite general and the details become less apparent.  One of the 
biggest weaknesses for this model is the general vulnerability category where it only captures 
implementation, design, or configuration vulnerabilities.  This general category is sometimes 
difficult to differentiate between design and implementation and gives no insight on what 
element was the source of the vulnerability.   
The AVOIDIT captured the technical details of attacks better than Howard and Longstaff’s 
model, but failed to describe intent or the actor in the attack.  This makes sense as the AVOIDIT 
model focuses in on vulnerabilities.  One confusing aspect of the AVOIDIT’s model is the 
“informational impact” category.  Divided into distort, disrupt, destruct, disclose, and discover, 
the category is not always obvious as to what that means.  Distort and disrupt are quite similar 
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as well as disclose and discover.  The AVOIDIT model’s defense category is general and gives 
little insight on how to implement the defense.  It points to either the CVE or general strategies 
such as remove from network, which can be implemented in countless ways.  Finally, the 
AVOIDIT model fails to take into account physical attacks (Simmons, 2014).   
Lockheed Martin’s Cyber Kill Chain gives ample details on the attack and individual actions that 
progress that attack.  However,  when looking at multiple attacks it becomes hard to compare 
them to each other without detailed analysis.   This model excels at looking at a single incident 
and how to defend oneself from the actions that occurred in the incident.   
How easy is the model to understand and communicate? 
Howard and Longstaff 
Computer and Network 
Incident Taxonomy 
AVOIDIT Cyber Attack 
Taxonomy 
Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill 
Chain 
• Reads like a sentence 
and quickly 
understood 
• Includes actors and 
motivations 
 
• Clearly states 
vulnerabilities that 
led to incident 
• Difficult to determine 
impact to 
organization 
 
• Detail oriented with 
clear steps of actor 
and incident 
• Difficult to compare 
multiple incidents 
• Each step difficult to 
categorize 
 
The model that stands out as easy to understand and communicate is Howard & Longstaff’s 
model.  It also is quite easy for a person with no knowledge of the cyber incident to quickly read 
the table and understand the steps and the outcomes of the cyber incident.  While the Cyber 
Kill Chain model gives many details and has clear steps, it requires more in depth reading to get 
a full grasp of the incident.  As for the AVOIDIT model, the actors and actions are difficult to 
understand quickly and require additional knowledge of the incident to fully understand the 
incident.   
Does the model give insight on how to defend in the future? 
Howard and Longstaff 
Computer and Network 
Incident Taxonomy 
AVOIDIT Cyber Attack 
Taxonomy 
Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill 
Chain 
• General description of 
vulnerability provides 
almost no insight 
• Motivation and 
attacker allow 
organization to 
prioritize defense 
• Specific vulnerability 
details and CVE’s 
• Difficult to determine 
the impact of the 
vulnerability 
• Defense category 
gives no insight on 
implementation 
• Specifies the steps 
involved in the attack 
and the weaknesses 
• Gives insight on the 
steps to mitigate the 
attack at each phase 
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The two models that excelled in this area were the AVOIDIT model and the Cyber Kill Chain.  
The AVOIDIT model clearly defines the vulnerability involved in the incident, although does not 
give insight on implementation of the defense necessary.  The Cyber Kill Chain model clearly 
defines the actions in each stage and gives direction on the actions necessary to stop the 
incident at each stage.  Howard and Longstaff’s model is too general to give effective 
information in how to defend into the future beyond the attackers, motivations, and if the 
vulnerability a design, implementation or configuration flaw.  The Cyber Kill Chain is the most 
effective at giving defensive insights.  
Does the model account for all areas of attacks and does the classification give meaningful 
information? 
Howard and Longstaff 
Computer and Network 
Incident Taxonomy 
AVOIDIT Cyber Attack 
Taxonomy 
Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill 
Chain 
• Covers all aspects of 
incidents  
• Categorization is 
general and doesn’t 
give meaningful 
distinction 
 
• Fails to capture 
attacker, motivation, 
and physical attacks 
• Gives meaningful 
information on 
vulnerability 
• Captures all the steps 
in an incident in detail 
• Gives meaningful 
information to better 
understand the 
incident 
 
For the question on whether the model accounts for all areas there was one model that had 
obvious factors not accounted for, AVOIDIT model.  The factors missing from the AVOIDIT 
model include the attacker, motivations, and physical attacks.  Both the Cyber Kill Chain and 
Howard and Longstaff’s model appear to capture all of the factors in cyber incidents.  They are 
able to capture them in different ways, but both are sufficiently broad in their categorizations 
to include the obvious elements.   
Is the model flexible enough to adapt to changes in cyber incidents? 
Howard and Longstaff 
Computer and Network 
Incident Taxonomy 
AVOIDIT Cyber Attack 
Taxonomy 
Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill 
Chain 
• Model is general 
enough to capture 
any changes in cyber 
incidents 
• Categories could be 
altered to capture any 
unforeseen change 
• Detailed and rigid 
structure of attack 
vector may need 
changes over time 
• Defense strategies 
and targets may 
change and require 
model changes 
• Fluid nature of model 
allows flexibility in 
interpretation and 
application 
• Phases of incidents 
unlikely to change 
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Flexibility is difficult to measure and it is also unclear as to how cyber incidents could change in 
the future.  Thus generalities and the ability to alter a category without compromising the 
larger model are best to measure the flexibility of a model.  The AVOIDIT model appeared to be 
rigid and resistant to change.  This is evident in the attack vector category.  Attack vectors are 
carefully prescribed and as cyber incidents continue to evolve they may cover multiple attack 
vectors which would make previous categorizations less effective.  Both the Cyber Kill Chain and 
Howard and Longstaff model appear flexible in that they are general enough or customizable to 
the individual incident that they are categorizing.  The AVOIDIT model is the least flexible of the 
three models with the other two being nearly equal in flexibility.   
Final Impressions of the Models 
All the models excel in one area or another and it is unfortunately impossible to determine a 
“best” model for cyber incident classification.  Perhaps a combination of the classifications and 
ideas of these models would produce an industry accepted best fit, but would prove 
challenging.  Ultimately, the determination of which classification model to analyze cyber 
incidents is up to the analyst themselves and what information they find most beneficial for 
their analysis. 
Conclusion 
This paper concludes with the idea that classification of cyber incidents is a difficult problem 
that does not have a clear solution.  Without a clear solution cyber incident classification will 
continue to be done in fragmented ways that add complexity to analyzing them as a whole.  On 
an individual level, models have benefits and detractions and knowing those elements assists in 
the individuals’ evaluation of cyber incidents in the future.   
Howard and Longstaff’s Computer and Network Incident Taxonomy allows quick and easy 
understanding of the events, motivations, attackers, and the outcomes.  While AVOIDIT focuses 
on the vulnerabilities used in the incident to give insight on the sources of insecurity and 
Lockheed Martin’s Cyber Kill Chain focuses on the detailed steps taken by the attacker and how 
to stop each step in the chain.  Applying these models to cyber incidents gives understanding 
and a better vision of the incident as a whole.  Choosing the correct model to apply relies on 
the motivations and information needed.   
Hopefully professionals will determine a standard for cyber incident classification, but until that 
day knowing the differences between models is paramount for analysis of current and past 
cyber incidents.  We all strive for better security and understanding what has happened leads 
to better security policies into the future.   
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Future Work 
As cyber incidents evolve the research of how those incidents relate to one another will 
continue to be important.  As Howard and Longstaff attempted, it is important that cyber 
security professionals can communicate using a “common language for computer security 
incidents” and a clear classification of incidents helps all in the industry.  Thus research on how 
to combine the detail of a Cyber Kill Chain analysis with the vulnerabilities of the AVOIDIT 
taxonomy, with the flexible and easily read nature of Howard and Longstaff’s would be 
beneficial and quite powerful in describing, categorizing, and fundamental in defending against 
these incidents in the future. 
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